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On the Relationship between Moral Virtue and 
Philosophy in Republic 
Introduction 
In the Republic Socrates says that the practice of philosophy should be limited to people 
who meet a certain set of requirements. The requirements are listed in book VI of the 
Republic as love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, open-mindedness, justice and 
gentleness, temperance and courage (Republic 487a). These requirements are not only 
intellectual but also moral. Those who study philosophy must have courage, justice and 
moderation. It seems then that Plato is committed to the view that a morally virtuous 
character is necessary for the successful pursuit of philosophy. I shall call this view the 
necessity thesis. That Plato is committed to such a view is clear from certain passages in 
Plato’s Republic where philosophical knowledge is attributed only to those with good 
characters. It is also clear from some dramatic representations of interlocutors failing to 
make progress in philosophical inquiry because of certain character defects. 
The necessity thesis draws an interesting connection between moral psychology and 
epistemology. The assumption is that one’s moral psychology contributes to one’s epistemic 
success. The basic claim of the necessity thesis is that our success in philosophical pursuits is 
partly dependent on the goodness of our moral characters. The idea is that only those with 
sufficiently good moral characters can make progress towards the goals of philosophy. It is 
on this basis that Socrates prescribes that only those with good moral characters should be 
allowed to do philosophy (Republic 539d), and thus restricts the practice of philosophy to 
only those who can succeed in it. Most institutions that offer philosophy today do not place 
any strict intellectual requirements, much less moral, for participation in philosophy. Thus 
Socrates prescription would seem strange to most contemporary philosophers. 
A significant amount of scholarship has focused on the ways in which philosophical inquiry 
contributes to the development of virtue and knowledge. But there has not been much 
focus on the relationship between the philosopher’s character and their philosophical 
pursuits. There has not been much scholarship on understanding how the philosopher’s 
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character shapes his philosophical pursuits. In particular, Plato’s necessity thesis has not 
been discussed sufficiently in current scholarship. However perplexing this claim is, it is one 
that Plato is clearly committed to. The claim that one has to have a certain kind of good 
character in order to reach the goals of philosophy is a fascinating claim which I think 
deserves more scholarly attention than it has received. 
Part of what is intriguing about Plato’s necessity thesis is its apparent strangeness. . That our 
philosophical success has anything to do with our moral characters, or require a particular 
sort of moral character, would appear very strange and incredible to most people. But I 
want to say that even if we do not agree with Plato about the particular virtues or the kind 
of moral character that he thinks is necessary for the successful pursuit of philosophy, the 
close connection he draws between moral character and philosophical inquiry is worthy of 
investigation, and could potentially illuminate the way in which we think about philosophy 
and our practice of philosophical inquiry.  
My objective in this paper is to understand Plato’s necessity thesis and to evaluate its 
plausibility. I divide the project into two main parts. The first part examines precisely what 
Plato might have meant by the necessity thesis by looking primarily at the Republic.  The 
second part of the project evaluates the plausibility of the thesis and considers whether 
moral virtue is really necessary for progress in philosophy. These two tasks are carried out in 
five chapters. 
In chapter one I sketch out a general account of what the necessity thesis amounts to. I 
offer two possible interpretations of the necessity thesis. The first interpretation tries to 
understand the necessity thesis by appealing to the nature of the process of philosophical 
inquiry and suggests that moral virtue is necessary because of the difficulty and social 
nature of philosophy. The second interpretation looks at philosophy as an inquiry concerned 
with knowledge of particular objects and suggests that moral virtue is necessary to achieve 
knowledge of these philosophical objects. I suggest that both interpretations are plausible 
but that the latter interpretation suggests a more intimate relationship between moral 
philosophy and virtue. I propose that an understanding of this intimate relationship 
between philosophy and virtue requires a deeper understanding of Plato’s conception of 
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philosophy and of virtue, and take up the task of elucidating these notions in chapters two 
and three. 
In chapter two I show that Platonic philosophy is ultimately concerned with wisdom-
knowledge of the good- and is thus ultimately ethical. I suggest that given this conception of 
philosophy, the necessity thesis should be understood as the view that moral virtue is 
necessary in order to achieve wisdom, and that the necessity thesis should be understood in 
relation to ethics. I raise one immediate concern with this formulation of the thesis. The 
concern is that understood this way, the necessity thesis basically says that we need virtue 
to become virtuous, which seems circular and nonsensical. I propose to look at Plato’s 
theory of virtue to make sense of what he means by the necessity thesis and do just this in 
the third chapter. 
In chapter three I explain Plato’s distinction between perfect and imperfect virtue, and 
characterize the latter as the love of the good and of reason. In light of this distinction, I 
formulate the necessity thesis as the view that imperfect virtue is necessary for becoming 
wise. I then go on to evaluate whether the thesis, understood this way, is plausible.  
In chapter four I show how imperfect virtue- a close affinity to the good and to reason- is 
necessary for knowledge of the good. Here I explain that Plato’s necessity thesis is based on 
what I call the similarity thesis. This thesis says that a certain relationship of likeness must 
hold between knower and the object known for knowledge of the object in question to be 
achieved. I then show the plausibility of the necessity thesis by showing how the likeness 
between imperfect virtue and the Good makes possible knowledge of the Good. 
In chapter five I raise one possible concern with the necessity thesis. The concern is that the 
thesis is too specific to the Platonic conception of philosophy and thus may not be relevant 
or plausible in the modern conception of philosophy. To address this problem, I focus on 
showing the relevance of the necessity thesis in modern ethics and argue that imperfect 
virtue is necessary for knowledge in modern ethics. 
Finally, I conclude by briefly considering what the implications of the necessity thesis are for 
current thinking about philosophy. I suggest that even if we are not convinced by what I 
present as Plato’s reasoning behind the thesis, the general connection that the thesis draws 
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between moral psychology and epistemic progress in philosophy, particularly in ethics, is 
worth further investigation. 
Chapter 1: Moral Virtue and Philosophy 
 
In the introduction I attributed the necessity thesis to Plato without explaining precisely 
what the thesis amounts to. In my understanding, the general claim of Plato’s thesis is that a 
morally virtuous character is necessary for the making progress in philosophy. The thesis 
therefore draws an important connection between moral character and philosophy. The 
basic contention is that our moral characters are partly responsible for the progress we 
make in philosophy. Plato seems to think that the kind of person one is morally is relevant 
to whether or not they succeed in philosophy. In particular, his claim is that the goodness of 
one’s character or lack thereof can enable or hinder one’s progress in achieving the goals of 
philosophy.  
In this chapter, I want to investigate precisely what the necessity thesis amounts to. I offer 
two interpretations of what Plato might have meant by the necessity thesis.  
1.1 Moral virtue and the activity of philosophical inquiry 
 
A cursory look at the Republic shows that Plato thought of philosophy as a long and difficult 
inquiry that aims at knowledge. For example: at 517b Socrates tells us that the form of the 
Good- which is the final object of philosophy- is reached with great difficulty. The difficulty 
of philosophy is also illustrated by  the prisoner’s struggle to move out of the cave, and how 
he is pained when he is forced to look at true things (515d-e).  
Philosophical inquiry is, for Plato, a cooperative activity for Plato. This is clear from the 
Socratic practice of philosophy. In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates is presented as engaged 
in philosophical inquiry with other people. In philosophical inquiry there is an exchange of 
views between people. Philosophy is had in communion with others or with the self as 
other.  
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Philosophical inquiry aims at knowledge. As far as philosophy is an inquiry that aims at 
knowledge, it is no surprise that Plato lists intellectual virtues such as ease in learning, open-
mindedness and good memory as part of the requirements for those who go on to study 
philosophy. Socrates says that these virtues are necessary to facilitate ease in learning and 
thinking about the difficult subjects of philosophy. For example:  philosophers need good 
memory in order to retain the knowledge that he gets through inquiry (Republic 486c). 
Given the nature of the activity of philosophical inquiry- its difficulty and cooperative 
dimension- one possible interpretation of what the necessity thesis means is that moral 
virtue is necessary for carrying out philosophical inquiry. In other words, moral virtue 
enables one to successfully engage in the activity of philosophical inquiry. The claim that 
intellectual virtues are necessary for philosophical inquiry would be accepted by most 
people. The more interesting, and perhaps controversial, view is the view that certain moral 
virtues are necessary as well. This is a view that Plato is clearly committed to. 
Plato adds some moral virtues to the list of qualities required for those who are to pursue 
philosophy (Republic 487a). Furthermore, in book VII Socrates says that moral virtue is 
necessary to prevent the possible harm that could result from ill practices of philosophical 
inquiry.1 At Republic 538c-539a he describes the harm that can result from philosophical 
practice if one does not have the right character for philosophical inquiry and because of 
this potential harm recommends that those who are allowed to engage in philosophical 
inquiry must satisfy certain moral conditions. 
What I want to do in the following paragraphs is to consider how the three moral virtues 
that Plato lists as necessary for philosophy (courage, justice and temperance) would be 
useful for persevering through difficult philosophical inquiry and for engaging successfully in 
this cooperative activity. 
It is easiest to see why courage is a virtue needed to endure the difficult study of 
philosophy. Courage is commonly understood as a quality that enables one to confront 
                                                          
1
 Plato, Republic, trans. G. M. A. Grube, revised C. D. C. Reeve, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis, 1992, Rep 
538d-539d. In these passages, the youth is presented as failing to successfully carry out philosophical inquiry 
because they cannot adequately deal with the questions they are challenged with by the sophists. The point is 
that a morally good person would be able to identify such questions as not aiming at the truth but rather at 
convincing them of some opinion. 
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difficult situations. In the Laches (192b-194b) courage is defined as a kind of endurance of 
the soul. The courageous man remains steadfast and confronts whatever difficult situation 
or adversity that he is facing. He perseveres through difficult situations. Understood as a 
kind of endurance, courage is then necessary for one to endure the difficult process of 
philosophical inquiry. The courageous person will make it through the difficult process 
because their courage enables them to carry out difficult inquiry and not to give up on the 
process easily. 
The second virtue that Plato lists as required for philosophy is justice. Justice is defined in 
book I as a kind of fairness, as giving to each his/her due (Republic 321e). Part of the 
difficulty of philosophical inquiry is that one is presented with various competing views on 
one topic. In philosophical inquiry one has to engage with different views on certain 
philosophical subject matter. One is often presented with many different and competing 
positions on a certain issue, and is required to consider these positions and to draw their 
own conclusions about the issue at hand. In order to successfully engage with competing 
views in philosophy, one has to engage with each position, giving it due praise and criticism. 
One has to examine each position on the issue fairly before they can draw their own 
conclusions. We might therefore say that justice is important for philosophy in so far as the 
philosopher needs to be fair when examining the different philosophical positions that he is 
presented with in his inquiry. A kind of fairness is required to form one’s own opinions on 
certain philosophical issues. 
Justice is also required for the social dimension of philosophy. One needs to be fair and to 
listen to other people when they share their views and to judge them fairly. In Republic I we 
see that Thrasymachus fails to do this and as a result fails to make progress in his inquiry. He 
is impatient when Socrates is speaking and cannot wait for his turn. And when he finally 
speaks, he guides Socrates and tells him not to give certain accounts of justice (Republic 
336b-d). Thrasymachus is unable to engage fairly with the accounts of justice Socrates gives. 
The process of philosophical inquiry is long and difficult and requires dedication and a 
commitment to truth. One may be tempted to stop before they reach the truth because 
they would rather pursue other goods. The virtue of moderation (or self-control) in 
philosophy is required to focus one’s attention on the pursuit of knowledge, and not to be 
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distracted by certain kinds of pleasures and desires. A self-controlled person regulates his 
pleasures and desires accordingly so that they do not interfere with his philosophical 
pursuits. In order for the philosopher to inquire into the truth, his other desires- which may 
distract his activity of inquiry- must be moderated. A moderate character controls the 
distractions that may deter our attention from the quest for truth (Republic 519a) 
This brief consideration shows that the moral virtues are useful for successfully carrying out 
philosophical inquiry. Hence, one reasonable interpretation of Plato’s necessity thesis is that 
moral virtue is necessary for one to make it through the difficult process of philosophical 
inquiry. On this interpretation, moral virtue is necessitated by the difficulty and cooperative 
nature of the process of philosophical inquiry. Philosophy as a process of inquiry requires 
moral virtue.  
Although not implausible, the account that moral virtue is necessary for philosophy because 
of the difficulty of philosophical inquiry and the cooperative dimension of such inquiry does 
not distinguish moral virtue as specifically necessary for philosophy but for any difficult 
inquiry. If it is the difficulty of the process of philosophical inquiry that necessitates a 
morally virtuous character, then it would seem that moral virtue must be necessary for 
other difficult and intellectually demanding subjects such as mathematics and physics. In 
other words, the moral virtues would be necessary for carrying out mathematical and 
scientific inquiries as well. This is an interesting implication. I do not think that it is 
unreasonable to suppose that a morally virtuous person would be more successful in 
subjects such as mathematics and physics because they possess certain moral virtues. But I 
suspect that this would appear odd to most people. So let us briefly consider how virtues 
such as courage and justice would be necessary for a mathematician or physicist to 
successfully carry out their inquiries. 
Imagine that a scientist has been working on developing a certain theory his whole life and 
one day, after many years working on this theory, his tests prove that the theory is false. I 
suppose that it would take courage for this scientist to continue with his scientific inquiry 
after such a discouraging event. It would also require a certain commitment to fairness from 
the scientist for him to accept the results of the tests and to accept that his theory is false. 
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The point here is that some kind of virtuousness would be required to face and succeed 
through the challenges that may arise when engaging in inquiry.  
On the above interpretation, philosophy, as an activity of inquiry, requires one to be morally 
virtuous to some extent. We need moral virtue to successfully carry out philosophical 
inquiry. While plausible, this interpretation does not present a more intimate and specific 
connection between philosophy and moral virtue because it does not distinguish moral 
virtue as necessary specifically for philosophy. Rather, moral virtue, on this interpretation, is 
necessary for successfully carrying out any difficult inquiry. My intuition is that there is a 
more intimate connection between moral virtue and philosophy than between moral virtue 
and other disciplines. In other words, I think there is a more specific way in which moral 
virtue is necessary for philosophy but not for other inquiries. We can find evidence for this 
more intimate connection between moral virtue and philosophy in the Republic. To 
understand this more specific and intimate connection between philosophy and moral 
virtue we need to distinguish philosophy from other kinds of inquiries. 
1.2 Moral virtue and philosophical knowledge 
 
For Plato, philosophy is distinguished by its objects. In Republic philosophy is presented as 
inquiry into the Good (Republic 521c). If philosophy is distinguished from other inquiries by 
its objects, then a possible interpretation of the necessity thesis is that moral virtue is 
necessary to understand the subject matter of philosophy. On this interpretation, moral 
virtue is necessary not because of the activity of philosophical inquiry, but more specifically 
in order to achieve understanding of philosophical objects. In other words, one has to be 
morally virtuous in order to understand the objects of philosophical inquiry. This 
interpretation of the necessity thesis implies that one needs to be a certain kind of knower 
to achieve knowledge in philosophy. We can find evidence for this interpretation of the 
thesis in Republic. 
At 485b-487a, Socrates lists the moral virtues as among the necessary qualities required for 
philosophy and says that such virtues are necessary for “a soul that is to have an adequate 
and complete grasp of that which is.” Socrates is clearly suggesting here that moral virtue is 
necessary for understanding the final object of philosophy: the Good. The Good is that 
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which is. “Plato links the fulfilment of our desire to know with our nature (physis), insisting 
that there is a kinship between the knower and the object of knowledge. It is only someone 
naturally inclined toward justice who can come to know and grasp what justice is (Rep 
443e–444b).”2 “A vicious person would never know either himself or a virtuous one, 
whereas a naturally virtuous person, when educated, will in time acquire knowledge of both 
virtue and vice. And it is someone like that who becomes wise, in my view, and not the bad 
person.”3 Plato is here suggesting that knowledge of certain objects can only be achieved by 
those who have virtuous characters. 
Socrates also says that: 
 “those who have no clear model of virtue in their souls cannot look to what is true, 
make constant reference to it and study it as exactly as possible. They cannot 
establish here on earth conventions about what is fine or just or good when they 
need to be established.”4  
The evidence above shows that part of what Plato meant by the necessity thesis is that 
moral virtue is necessary for understanding philosophical objects. According to Plato, one 
needs to be morally virtuous to achieve knowledge of the objects of philosophy.  
1.3 Conclusion  
 
What I have done is to briefly outline two possible interpretations of the necessity thesis 
that can be supported by Plato’s views in the Republic. On one interpretation, moral virtue 
is required for successfully carrying out philosophical inquiry understood as a difficult and 
cooperative activity. On another interpretation, moral virtue is required in order to 
understand philosophical content, that is, to achieve philosophical knowledge. Both 
accounts are interesting and reasonable in their own right and together they give a more 
complete sense of what Plato might have meant by the necessity thesis. But because of the 
first interpretation’s shortfall- the fact that it does not distinguish moral virtue as required 
specifically for philosophy rather than other inquiries- I will mostly concern myself with the 
                                                          
2
 Tschemplik A, Knowledge and Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Theaetetus, Lexington Books, Lanham, 2008, p. 7  
3
 Rep 409d 
4
 Rep 484c-d 
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second interpretation from now going forward. My goal in the following chapters is to 
understand this interpretation of the necessity thesis more precisely before I evaluate its 
plausibility.  
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Chapter 2:  The Nature of Philosophy 
The necessity thesis, as I now understand it, states that moral virtue is necessary for 
understanding the subject matter of philosophy. This implies that one needs to be a morally 
virtuous knower to achieve knowledge of the objects of philosophy. This formulation of the 
necessity thesis captures the unique relationship between moral virtue and philosophy. It 
suggests that there is something in particular about the objects of philosophy that requires 
one to be morally virtuous in order to know them.  In order to evaluate this thesis, we need 
to understand more precisely what philosophy’s objects and goals are. This is the task I take 
up in this chapter. My aim is to understand Plato’s conception of philosophy in Republic. 
2.1 The ancient conception of philosophy 
 
Plato’s conception of philosophy falls within the broader tradition of ancient philosophy. 
Hence a useful way for understanding his conception of philosophy is to start by 
understanding the general ancient conception of philosophy.  
The ancient philosophers conceived of philosophy as “a specific discourse linked to a way of 
life and a way of life linked to a specific discourse”.5 According to this conception of 
philosophy, “philosophy is above all a way of life, but one that is intimately linked to a 
philosophical discourse.”6 The theoretical discourses that have come to constitute 
philosophy today were viewed by the ancient philosophers as means to the more general 
goal of transforming the self for wisdom. Philosophical discourse did not aim at a purely 
abstract knowledge but was a means to self-transformation for virtue.7 Hence for the 
ancient philosophers, philosophy was not merely theoretical, it was ultimately practical. It 
was “a practice intended to carry out a radical change in our being.”8 
                                                          
5
 Hadot P, What is Ancient Philosophy, Michael Chase (trans), Harvard University Press, USA, 2004 
p. 23 
6
 Hadot P, op. cit., p. 4 
7
 Futter D, ‘Introduction’, Philosophical Papers, 43 (1), 2014, p. 1 
8
 Hadot P, op. cit., p. 176  
This conception of philosophy as a way of life is fairly rare today. Only a few traditions or philosophers 
maintain this conception of philosophy. Examples of such traditions and/or philosophers include the 
existentialist tradition some of whose members include Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Nietzsche and Marcel.  
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In the ancient conception, philosophy was viewed as a spiritual exercise and as work on the 
soul.9 “The discourses of the philosopher were empty if they did not contribute to curing the 
diseases of the soul.”10  “Philosophy was studied by ancient philosophers and their students 
as the best way to become good and to live good human lives.”11 The ancient philosophers 
used philosophical theories in order to strive for virtue. Engagement with philosophical 
theories through dialogue with others was a spiritual exercise intended to transform the 
subject who practiced it.12 Philosophical theories were developed in order to transform the 
philosopher’s character for wisdom rather than to exist independently as systems of 
theoretical knowledge. All theoretical thinking in the different fields of philosophy was in 
service of the general goal of achieving wisdom. That all thinking in philosophy ultimately 
served to inform and guide the practice of a certain way of life is intriguing. It is not so 
obvious to see how one’s theory of causation and similar topics could directly inform or 
guide one’s practice. But this is an idea that the ancients were committed to. 
The ancient philosophers make a useful distinction between discourses of philosophy and 
philosophy itself. Philosophy as a way of life is an existential option, a mode of being and 
living that flows from one’s philosophical theories.  Philosophical discourse is part of the 
philosophical way of life. 
The relationship between discourse and the way of life of the philosopher is harmonising- 
philosophical discourses shape the way of life adopted by the philosopher, and the way of 
life in turn shapes the philosopher’s discourses. The way of life that the philosopher adopts 
is informed by his discourses and his discourses shape his way of life. Nehamas expresses 
this point succinctly in the following quote. He says:  
Those who practice philosophy as the art of living construct their personalities 
through the investigation, the criticism, and the production of philosophical views—
views, that is, that belong to the repertoire of philosophy as we have come to 
understand it… More important, the philosophers of the art of living make the 
articulation of a mode of life their central topic: it is by reflecting on the problems of 
                                                          
9
 Hutter H, ‘Philosophy as Self-transformation’, Historical Reflections/Reflexions Historiques, 16(2), 1989,p.176 
10
 Epicurus 
11
 Cooper J, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus. Princeton: 
University Press., 2012, p. 2 
12
 Hadot P, op. cit., p. 6 
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constructing a philosophical life that they construct the life their work constitutes. 
The body of work that reflects on the philosophical life is the very content of the life 
it composes.13  
“The ancients assume a seamless connection between philosophical views and the way of 
life- exemplified by one’s actions- of the holders of those views.”14 The idea here is that it is 
by reflection on philosophical discourses that philosophers construct a philosophical life. In 
other words the philosopher’s way of life is informed and shaped by his thinking on the 
subjects of philosophy: ethics, logic and science. According to the ancient conception of 
philosophy, “all thinking in the fields of philosophy was integrated and presented as a single 
body of knowledge to serve as a means to living the best life.”15  
 It is important to notice that for the ancient philosophers “philosophy is discourse and a 
way of life which tends towards wisdom without ever achieving it.”16 Philosophical discourse 
was never perfect. The various philosophical theories of knowledge, virtue, justice etc. were 
never completely satisfactory.  
In the ancient conception of philosophy the wise person is unreachable, but the lover of 
wisdom is considered entirely attainable.17 The philosopher never comes to possess 
wisdom.18 Wisdom is ‘not a possession but a process’.19 “To be good for a human being is to 
inquire into the good constantly and in dialogue with others.”20 It is in the continued inquiry 
into virtue that we make progress towards wisdom although we never achieve it. 
What is clear is that for the ancient philosophers, philosophy was ultimately aimed at 
achieving the highest virtue: wisdom. The philosophical discourse that has come to 
constitute philosophy today was a means of achieving this goal of wisdom. This idea that 
philosophy ultimately aims at wisdom is most clear in Plato. What I want to do next is to 
discuss Plato’s conception of philosophy as a version of the ancient conception of 
                                                          
13
 Nehamas A, The Art of Living: Socratic reflections from Plato to Foucault, University of California Press, 1998, 
p. 6 
14
 Cooper J, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus, op. cit., p. 15 
15
 Cooper J, Pursuits of Wisdom: Six Ways of Life in Ancient Philosophy from Socrates to Plotinus, op. cit., p. 7 
16
 Hadot P, op. cit., p. 4 
17
 Hadot P, op. cit., p. 46 
18
 Hadot P, op. cit., p. 46 
19
 Gonzalez F, op. cit., p. 34 
20
 Gonzalez F, op. cit., p. 34 
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philosophy. A closer look at Plato’s specific conception of philosophy will be useful for 
achieving a more exact understanding of what he meant by the necessity thesis. 
2.2 Philosophy as the ascent to the Good 
 
Earlier on I suggested that a cursory look at Plato suggests that philosophy, according to 
Plato, is an activity of inquiry that aims at knowledge of certain objects. In this section I look 
at Plato’s conception of philosophy more precisely. 
In the Republic philosophy is described as an inquiry that aims at knowledge of the Good. 
Philosophical inquiry is hence described as the “ascent to the form of the good” (Republic 
521c). The Good is the final object of philosophical inquiry. In Republic VI Socrates describes 
an image of what the Good is (Republic 506e).21 He describes the Good in terms of its 
function in the intelligible realm and says that the Good is the cause of knowledge and 
truth, and of goodness and being. He says that although the Good is the cause of these 
things, it is itself none of these things. It transcends these things in beauty and truth 
(Republic 508c-509b). Plato describes how philosophical inquiry facilitates the ascent to the 
Good through the powerful allegory of the cave. 
In the cave analogy, Plato presents philosophical inquiry as an activity that facilitates the 
turning of the soul away from the darkness of the cave towards the light of the sun, away 
from that which is coming to be towards that which is.22 The point here is that philosophical 
inquiry directs the soul to study what is. Plato insists that no knowledge can be achieved 
until the soul as a whole is turned towards what is (Republic 518c). Knowledge, according to 
Plato, is necessarily of what is (Republic 477a). 
The philosopher is described in the Republic as a lover of wisdom. He is distinguished by his 
desire and pursuit of wisdom (Republic 475b). As a lover of wisdom, his activities aim at 
wisdom. Wisdom is defined in Republic as knowledge of the good of the whole (Republic 
442c). Thus the kind of knowledge that the philosopher aims at is knowledge of the whole, 
                                                          
21
 Socrates says that he’s afraid he will not be able to give an account what the good is precisely and that he 
will look ridiculous trying. He acknowledges his lack of knowledge of the good instead of claiming to know.   
22
 Rep 518c 
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that is, wisdom. The philosopher does not seek knowledge of good things, but the good 
itself. He is not satisfied until he grasps virtue. Socrates says that the true philosopher: 
…neither loses nor lessens his erotic love until he grasps the being of each nature 
itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp it, because of its kinship with it, 
and that, once getting near what really is and having intercourse with it and having 
begotten understanding and truth, he knows and truly lives…23 
The philosopher by consorting with the form of the good- the source of truth and goodness- 
himself becomes as good and wise as humanly possible (Republic 500d). The transformative 
power of philosophical inquiry has something to do with the activity that we are engaged in 
in this inquiry and the nature of the objects that we are studying. We become wise through 
inquiry into the good. 
Plato’s conception of philosophy is ultimately ethical. The final object of philosophical 
inquiry is the Good. This means that philosophy ultimately aims at knowledge of virtue. The 
philosopher’s inquiries are for the sake of wisdom. Plato did not view philosophy as 
ultimately concerned with producing abstract theoretical knowledge but rather as 
concerned with transforming the individual for wisdom. Now that we have expounded 
Plato’s conception of philosophy we can understand the necessity thesis to be saying that 
moral virtue is necessary for becoming wise. This means that knowledge of the Good can 
only be obtained by those with good characters. Understood this way, the necessity thesis is 
restricted to ethics.  
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Chapter 3: The Nature of Moral Virtue 
In light of the Platonic conception of philosophy, we should now understand the necessity 
thesis as the view that moral virtue is necessary for wisdom. In other words, one needs to 
be morally virtuous to become wise. But this seems absurd. How can one be virtuous if one 
does not have knowledge of virtue? How do we make sense of this? We need to understand 
Plato’s theory of virtue and understand what he meant by the necessity thesis. This is my 
task in this chapter. 
3.1 Virtue as harmony in Republic 
 
Generally when we think of virtue we think of certain traits or good qualities that people 
have such as kindness, compassion, honesty and so on. The prime examples of moral virtues 
according to the ancient philosophers are courage, temperance, justice and wisdom. 
Although they considered such qualities as honesty, compassion and friendliness as noble 
and part of living well, the ancient philosophers commonly classified the four listed virtues 
as the primary moral virtues. In his discussion of virtue in the Republic Plato focuses on 
these four virtues. What I want to do in the next paragraphs is to elucidate Plato’s 
understanding of virtue in the Republic. 
In Republic Plato argues that the soul has three parts, each corresponding to the three types 
of desire: rational, spirited and appetitive (Republic 439d-e). The soul is basically divided 
into two main parts: the rational part and the irrational parts. The irrational part of the soul 
consists of the spirited and appetitive elements, and the rational part consists of reason. In 
light of this tri-partite theory of the soul, Plato describes virtue as a complex relationship of 
harmony between the different parts of the soul. “True virtue is a kind of health, fine 
condition, and well-being of the soul (Republic 444e).” This fine condition of the soul 
consists in a ‘natural relation of control’ between the parts of the soul (Republic 444d).In a 
virtuous soul “reason provides the knowledge of the right ends to pursue and the means to 
achieve them, and desire is habituated to want the things that reason determines as 
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right.”24 Reason governs with knowledge and determines what is best to do, and spirit 
follows and carries out the declarations of reason.  
What is important in this theory of virtue is that the soul of a virtuous person is governed by 
knowledge provided by reason. For Plato, no one is truly virtuous unless they have 
knowledge. A virtuous soul must be governed by knowledge of the Good. In other words, 
this knowledge must be the organizing principle for the soul. All action and thought must be 
motivated by knowledge of the Good. 
3.2 Perfect and imperfect virtue in Republic 
 
In book IV of the Republic, Plato introduces a different kind of virtue which he calls civic 
virtue. After defining courage as “the power to preserve through everything the correct and 
law-inculcated belief about what is to be feared and what isn’t”, Socrates says that this 
definition should be properly thought of as a definition of civic courage rather than courage 
proper.25 This kind of virtue, I suppose, is to be contrasted with the kind of virtue that we 
have described above as knowledge governed virtue. We may understand the distinction 
between the two types of virtue as that between civic and philosophic virtue. Kamtekar 
refers to the two types of virtue as imperfect and perfect respectively. Broadie dubs them 
mere virtue and refined virtue respectively. And Gill distinguishes them as pre- and post-
reflective virtue. What really is the difference between these two types of virtue? 
According to Lutz the key difference is that “those with civic courage stand by correct 
opinions that they have absorbed from laws, while those with the nobler courage stand by 
what is proclaimed by reason.”26 In both cases courage is a kind of preservation. The 
difference is in the motivation one has for this preservation. Those with civic virtue preserve 
the beliefs that were inculcated by the law while those with true courage preserve the 
declarations of reason. The civically courageous preserve what they were taught through 
their education and the philosophically virtuous preserve what they belief through reason.  
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Kamtekar also emphasizes that the difference in these two kinds of virtue is in their 
motivations. She says that “the motivation philosophers have for being virtuous is their 
knowledge of how virtue is good. Their virtue is informed by their knowledge rather than 
the laws of the city.”27 Perfect virtue is guided by knowledge whereas imperfect virtue is 
informed by the laws of the city which are inculcated through education. Perfect virtue is 
thus restricted to philosophers, because they alone can have knowledge.28  
For Broadie, the difference is in terms of the view of the value of virtue. Merely virtuous 
people value virtue as a means to some other desired end such as wealth or honour. 
Persons of refined virtue value virtue for its sake. They view virtue as fine and good in and of 
itself.29 It is reasonable to suppose that lacking the knowledge of what virtue is and why it is 
good, the imperfectly virtuous will value virtue for all the goods that it brings and fail to see 
it as intrinsically valuable. This is not necessarily a bad thing. After all, virtue does bring all of 
the other goods. The important point here is that the imperfectly virtuous value virtue only 
for the goods that it brings and this is because he lacks the knowledge to understand the 
intrinsic value of virtue. In this sense, his virtue is deficient because he lacks knowledge.  
The difference between the two types of virtue can be characterized in terms of knowledge 
and the lack thereof.  An imperfectly virtuous person has the right dispositions but has no 
independent knowledge of what virtue is and why it is good. In contrast, the philosopher’s 
virtue is a function of their knowledge and understanding. They know what is truly good and 
why virtue is valuable. Imperfect virtue consists in a set of dispositions to have appropriate 
responses in particular situations. The imperfectly virtuous has a kind of pre-reflective 
decency that is developed through habituation in good things that allows him to choose 
good actions. 
The deficiency of imperfect virtue lies in the lack of knowledge. The lack of knowledge 
prevents one from becoming truly virtuous. Virtue is perfected in knowledge. Aristotle 
expresses this point beautifully when he says that “without wisdom, virtue is like a body 
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that moves about without sight, and so is prone to stumble.”30 But what is this knowledge, 
the possession of which completes one’s virtue? 
In order to find the kind of knowledge that completes one’s virtue we must look at the 
knowledge possessed by philosophers. The kind of knowledge possessed by the philosopher 
is described in many parts of the Republic as wisdom- the ability to judge well about things 
that are good and beneficial for the whole.31 Wisdom is defined as knowledge of the Good. 
The philosopher’s knowledge is described as superior because it has as its object of 
contemplation the form of the Good itself- the whole of goodness- rather than the many 
good things.  For Plato, no one is virtuous, strictly speaking, who does not have knowledge 
of the good. One cannot be truly virtuous unless they know what virtue is. The true beliefs 
that are inculcated through the education program in the Republic about what is good are 
not sufficient to make one truly virtuous.32 True virtue results from philosophical reflection 
on the nature and value of the good. Hence perfect virtue is restricted to the philosophers 
for they alone can possess this kind of knowledge through contemplating the Good.  
To summarize, perfect virtue is a psychological condition in which “reason, with its 
knowledge, determines what is best for the person; spirit identifies with reason’s directives, 
regarding them as objects to strive for and making the person dissatisfied with himself if 
through his own fault they are not attained; and appetite restrained and moderated by 
reason and spirit, finds pleasure in the objects that reason determine as good.”33 A truly 
virtuous person is governed by reason with its knowledge about what is good for the whole 
soul.  
Imperfect virtue, on the other hand, is a kind of pre-philosophical moral decency that is 
formed through habituation. This kind of virtue gives us stable dispositions to respond 
appropriately in different situations.34 It makes us apt to choose, think and behave in certain 
ways.35 This kind of virtue is without knowledge, and hence it is a disposition of our 
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irrational parts: spirit and appetite. What I want to do is to elaborate on this idea of 
imperfect virtue by looking at how Plato characterizes this kind of virtue in the Republic. 
3.3 Imperfect virtue as love of the good and of reason 
 
Plato’s characterization of imperfect virtue can be found in his discussions of the 
prospective philosophers’ characters. The moral character of these prospective 
philosophers is described in the discussion of their education and summed up in Socrates’ 
discussion of the character of the products of the moral education prescribed in the 
Republic. Socrates sums up the virtues of the products of the early education program at 
401d-402a. He says:  
…education in music and poetry is most important first because rhythm and 
harmony permeate their inner part of the soul more than anything else, affecting it 
most strongly and bringing it grace so that if someone is properly educated in music 
and poetry, it makes him graceful, but if not, then the opposite. Secondly because 
anyone who receives this education will sense it acutely when something has been 
omitted and when it has not been finely crafted or finely made by nature. And since 
he has the right distastes, he’ll praise fine things, be pleased by them, receive them 
into his soul, and being nurtured by them, become fine and good. He’ll rightly object 
to what is shameful, hating it whilst still young and unable to grasp the reason, but, 
having been educated in this way, he will welcome the reason when it comes and 
recognise it easily because of its kinship with himself. 
Here we see that the virtue possessed by the products of the elementary education consists 
in their love for the good and love of reason. At 403c Socrates tells us that the moral 
education ends in “the love of the fine and beautiful”. The products of Plato’s moral 
education are described as having the right tastes and distastes (loving good and despising 
evil) and loving reason. “The decent person, insofar as he is decent, delights in virtuous 
actions and is pained by bad ones just as a musical person delights in fine and beautiful 
songs and is pained by worthless ones.”36 
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At this stage though, the philosopher is “not yet able to grasp the reason” and he does not 
yet possess knowledge of why the things that are good are good. His virtue at this point 
consists in the right dispositions of the spirited and appetitive parts. These parts of his soul 
are developed to have a “close kinship” with reason and to “welcome reason” when it 
comes. Imperfect virtue is thus a disposition of one’s spirit and appetite. These elements are 
shaped to recognize good and to be attracted to it. The desires of the soul are trained to be 
subordinate to the governance of reason. 
That imperfect virtue is a disposition of the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul can be 
inferred from the fact that Plato’s early education program aims to train these two parts of 
the soul. There is some debate about which parts of the soul the education program aims at 
developing which I will not go into. But at 411e of Republic Socrates suggests that it is the 
“spirited and wisdom-loving parts” of the soul that are trained to be in harmony with each 
other through the elementary program. Notice that it is the wisdom-loving parts of the soul 
and not the rational part that is trained through the moral education. At the stage of 
elementary education, the youth are said not to have developed their reasoning capacity 
yet.37 This is why they do not have knowledge. One interesting thing to note is that nothing 
is explicitly said about training of the appetitive parts. It seems that this part of the soul 
must be dominated and controlled by spirit and reason.38 The education in fine things serves 
to suppress or moderate the desires of this appetitive part of the soul. Socrates says that 
“fine things are those that subordinate the beast-like parts of our nature to the human.”39   
Socrates’ description of the character of the prospective philosophers suggests that the 
moral education program culminates in the love of the fine and reason. The prospective 
philosophers’ imperfect virtue consists in their love of good and love of reason. The moral 
education in the Republic seems to focus on getting the prospective philosophers to realise 
the beauty or fineness of virtue, and to be attracted to all things fine by exposing them to 
images of the good. It instils in them true beliefs about what is good.  
Imperfect virtue involves the ability to distinguish fine things and the disposition to delight 
in them. “This ability to pick out representations of fine virtue and to distinguish them from 
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vice does not amount to understanding why these judgments are true. However, to the 
person who is recognizing courage when he sees it, the rational account of courage, when it 
comes, will have ‘the ring of truth’ since it harmonizes with his sense of the way things seem 
to be.”40 The imperfectly virtuous person pursues only those things that appear good. They 
do not really know that these things are good. Knowledge of good is obtained by those who 
are perfectly virtuous. But since the imperfectly virtuous have been educated in images of 
the true good, they have an acute sense of what is good. In other words, they have true 
beliefs about what is good even though they do not truly know what it is.  
3.4 Conclusion  
 
In Republic Plato neither simply praises nor condemns imperfect virtue. He makes clear the 
deficiencies of this type of virtue but also represents it as central to the full development of 
the virtuous philosopher.41 A proper sense of the fine and desire for the fine is  prerequisite 
for developing the philosopher’s virtue.42 The philosopher’s imperfect virtue consists in his 
affinity to the good and his true beliefs about what the good is.  
Now that we have expounded Plato’s conception of philosophy and of virtue, we are in a 
position to state more precisely what Plato’s necessity thesis amounts to. As I now 
understand it, the necessity thesis is restricted to ethics. The claim is that one needs to be of 
a certain kind of character to have knowledge of ethical objects. Specifically, Plato’s view is 
that imperfect virtue- the disposition to good- is necessary to obtain an accurate 
understanding of the Good. Knowledge of the Good is possible only for those who are to 
some extent good.  
Plato’s necessity thesis, as we understand it now, states that imperfect virtue- a disposition 
towards the good- is necessary to achieve knowledge of the Good. This means that one has 
to be good to some extent to become wise. Now that we have this understanding of the 
necessity thesis, we can evaluate its plausibility. 
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Chapter 4: Imperfect Virtue and Knowledge of the Good 
 
In this chapter I want to consider Plato’s justification for the necessity thesis and to examine 
the plausibility of the thesis.  
4.1 Plato’s justification for the necessity thesis: the similarity principle 
 
The underlying principle for Plato’s view that imperfect virtue is necessary to reach an 
accurate understanding of the Good is what I will call the similarity principle. The   similarity 
principle states that knowledge of certain objects can be achieved only when the knower is 
somehow akin to those objects. The basic claim of the principle is that ‘like-knows-like’. In 
other words, a certain relationship of likeness or similarity must hold between the knower 
and the object of knowledge if knowledge of the object is to be achieved. For example: one 
must be good to some extent to know the good. “We can grasp the reality we wish to know 
only by becoming spiritually similar to it.”43 One is better able to understand the things that 
they are somehow akin to.  
The similarity principle seems generally plausible. We would accept that one has to be 
musical to produce good music and also accept that one has to be mathematical to 
understand mathematics. There is also a sense in which one has to be faithful to understand 
faith. In these examples, it seems that a relationship of similarity must hold between the 
knower and the object known in order for knowledge to be achieved. The knower must be 
similar to the objects that he wishes to know. Let us look at how this principle is supposed 
to work in the case of the necessity thesis 
The necessity thesis says that we need imperfect virtue to know the Good. In simpler terms, 
the claim is that one must be partially good in order to know the Good. Why do we need to 
be good to have knowledge of the Good? Basically, Plato seems to think that the likeness of 
imperfect virtue to the Good makes it possible for us to know the Good. In other words, 
some partial goodness on the part of the knower enables knowledge of the Good. But how 
does partial goodness- a likeness to the good- enable us to know the Good? We saw in the 
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previous chapter that Plato describes imperfect virtue as the love of reason and of the good. 
What we must ask then is: how does the love of the good and of reason help one achieve 
knowledge of the Good? 
4.1.1 Loving the good and seeing the Good 
 
In order to know the Good, we must direct our learning efforts towards it and study it 
carefully. The pursuit of knowledge of the Good becomes a vocation only once it is 
recognised as valuable just in the same way as, say, “medicine becomes a vocation only 
when the value of health is recognised and used as an organising principle.”44 The love of 
the good- which is characteristic of imperfect virtue- sets knowledge of the Good as the 
ideal towards which to strive. Someone who is attracted to the good will fix their attention 
towards the good. For the lover of good, the good becomes the ideal towards which all their 
activities aim.  
Plato takes it for granted that our activities always aim at the good. In  Republic Socrates 
says that:  
“every soul pursues the good and does whatever it does for its sake. It divines that 
the good is something but is perplexed and cannot adequately grasp what it is or 
acquire the sort of stable beliefs it has about other things, and so it misses the 
benefit, if any, that even those other things may give.”45  
Although we always try to pursue what is good, we do not always know what it is. We are 
not always able to correctly identify it. This failure to correctly identify  the Good is, 
according to the necessity thesis,  attributed to one’s character. “A person whose moral 
viewpoint is distorted has desires and emotional responses, which constitute his evaluative 
perspective, that do not correlate correctly with the descriptive contents of acts and objects 
that are really admirable or desirable.”46 In other words a person whose moral character is 
deficient does not have true beliefs about what is good and so his actions are not good. But 
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someone who is in some sense good is able to correctly identify the good as such because of 
their acquaintance with it.  
A disposition towards the good is thus necessary for one to correctly identify what the good 
is. A lover of the good is in some sense good because they have true beliefs about what is 
good, and these true beliefs constitute their evaluative perspective. These beliefs direct him 
towards the true good. Because of his dispositions to the good, and his true beliefs about it, 
he looks for the Good in the ‘right places’. If I am inclined towards the good, then my ‘vision’ 
is directed towards good things. I am thus able to identify the Good because the Good is to 
be found amongst good things, since the Good is the organising principle of all good things 
(Republic 509c). It is the goodness of good things.  
In contrast to the lover of good, a vicious person’s perspective and vision is oriented 
towards bad things. Thus he looks for the good in the pleasures of the world or in some 
other place where he will not find it. Because his vision is directed towards evil, he is unable 
to see the good. Socrates is careful to emphasize that the vicious person is equally keen 
sighted and so his failure to see the Good is not due to a lack of keen sight. He has the ability 
to see things clearly (Republic 519a). His inability to see the Good is rather because of where 
his vision is directed. His vision is directed towards - the earthly pleasures. If he can be freed 
from these pleasures, he would see the good most clearly (Republic 519b). 
We can see that the love of the good focuses one’s attention to the true nature of the good. 
This love of the good, as is clear from Plato’s discussion of the elementary education, is 
developed by shaping one’s desires towards the good. An imperfectly virtuous person has a 
certain familiarity with the true good which allows them to correctly identify it wherever it 
appears. Their true beliefs about the Good sets them on the right path to true knowledge of 
the good. In the Meno Socrates tells us that it is not possible to inquire into something that 
we are not familiar with, for then we will not be able to identify it even if we find it.47 So the 
pre-philosophical (true) beliefs we form about the good through habituation are necessary 
to launch us into inquiry about virtue and to help us identify it as such when we see it.48 
These opinions shape our character to be good, and this kinship with goodness enables us 
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to identify true accounts of justice, courage etc. To the person who has true beliefs about 
justice, the correct account of justice, when it comes, will harmonise with what he knows 
and have a ‘ring of truth’ to it.49  
4.1.2 Love of reason and knowing the Good 
 
To know the Good is to have an accurate understanding of what it is. In order to come to an 
accurate understanding of it, we must investigate it by means of reason. But as we saw with 
the example of a vicious but clever person, reason together with the desires of the soul, has 
to be directed towards the good for knowledge of the Good to be achieved. Reason cannot 
be turned without turning the whole soul (Republic 518c). Once the soul has been turned 
towards the right objects, reason can begin its investigation into the Good.   
Commitment to reasoning well is necessary to achieve an accurate understanding of the 
Good. The person who is not rational- does not follow the demands of reason- will not be 
able to come to a true account of the Good. The lover of reason, on the other hand, is 
willing to follow reason wherever it leads and is thus able to come to a more accurate 
understanding of the Good. The lover of reason is also willing to revise his beliefs in light of 
his reasons and is committed to maintaining rational order in his soul. In other words he is 
willing to subordinate his irrational desires to the determinations of reason. The love of 
reason- which is characteristic of the imperfectly virtuous person- makes one ‘welcoming’ of 
reason and receptive to the declarations of reason about what is good. 
The lover of reason is welcoming of reason and is disposed to revise his beliefs and 
transform his practice in light of reason. Such a person is psychologically moved- made to 
reflect on himself and his practice- by reason. A person’s affective states must be focused 
onto reason if reason is to inspire any change in the person.50 Someone whose commitment 
to non-rational motivations overrides his commitment to reason may understand the 
reason but fail to be psychologically moved by it.51 
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The love of reason is also important for us to be transformed into virtue by our knowledge 
of the Good. A lover of reason is receptive to reason, and this receptivity makes it possible 
for him to receive reason’s knowledge into his soul and to be transformed into virtue by this 
knowledge. This point is captured beautifully by Aristotle in a number of quotes. He says: 
…discourses appear to have the power to encourage and stimulate open-natured 
young people, and would make a well-born character that loves what is truly 
beautiful be inspired with virtue, but they are unable to encourage most people 
toward what is beautiful and good.52 
…argument and teaching are perhaps not powerful in all people, but it is necessary 
for the soul of the listener to have been worked on beforehand by means of habits, 
with a view to enjoying and hating in a beautiful way, like ground that is going to 
nourish the seed. For someone who lives by feeling could not hear words that would 
turn him away, nor could he even understand them; when someone is in that 
condition, how is it possible to change his mind? And in general, feeling seems to 
yield not to reasoned speech but to force. So it is necessary for a character to be 
present in advance that is in some way appropriate for virtue, loving what is 
beautiful and scorning what is shameful.53 
The important point in these quotes is that the love of the good and of reason is necessary 
in order for us to be transformed to virtue by knowledge of the good. In other words, an 
imperfectly virtuous character is necessary if the transformative power of philosophy is to 
be effective in one’s life. A good character is characterized by “its kinship to virtue, and 
receptiveness to arguments directed to encouraging virtue.”54 Such a character is able to 
receive the knowledge of virtue into its soul and to be shaped by it.55 
The idea is that “one’s attitude to the canons of reason can have vital (practical) 
consequences for the way one lives one’s life.”56 “Reason will appeal and be of use to the 
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well-brought up student because he is ready to form his desires in light of reasoning.”57 
Reason cannot properly influence someone whose outlook is distorted and distorting.58 The 
rational activity of philosophy fails to be transformative- reason’s declarations fail to be 
realized in practice- when we do not have a pre-commitment to follow reason and to be 
governed by it.59 The transformative power of reason can only be effective if one has an 
overriding commitment to reason. When we lack the love of reason, when our commitment 
to reason is trumped by other commitments, we fail to be transformed by reason in the 
manner in which we should be. We fail to follow reason and hence fail to know the good.  
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Chapter 5: The relevance of the necessity thesis to modern 
philosophy 
The necessity thesis says that one needs some partial virtue to become wise. On the 
Platonic conception of philosophy and virtue, it seems that the necessity thesis is plausible. I 
showed this by showing how an imperfectly virtuous character helps us come to an accurate 
understanding of the Good. In this chapter I want to consider the relevance and plausibility 
of the necessity thesis in modern philosophy.  
5.1 The problem of relevance 
 
As we have come to understand it, the necessity thesis states that imperfect virtue is 
necessary for becoming wise. One possible concern with the necessity thesis is that it might 
be plausible within Plato’s conception of philosophy but not relevant or plausible in the 
contemporary conception of philosophy. The modern conception of philosophy might differ 
in important ways to Plato’s conception of philosophy and thus render the necessity thesis 
simply irrelevant. 
In one sense it is reasonable that we should adhere to Plato’s conception of philosophy in 
understanding Plato’s necessity thesis. The necessity thesis is attributed to Plato. This is why 
a large part of this project is dedicated to understanding the necessity thesis in relation to 
Plato. It will not help our understanding of the thesis to impose a conception of philosophy 
that is contrary to Plato’s own conception. However, the project would be less interesting if 
we completely restrict ourselves to understanding the necessity thesis within Plato’s 
conception of philosophy. The necessity thesis could be true in the given the Platonic 
conception of philosophy but simply irrelevant in the contemporary conception of 
philosophy. It is important then to explore the necessity thesis in relation to the modern 
conception of philosophy. 
To consider the relevance and plausibility of the necessity thesis in modern philosophy, we 
must understand the differences between the Platonic and modern conceptions of 
philosophy. What I am going to do now is to discuss the modern conception of philosophy 
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and compare it with the Platonic conception before I look at the plausibility of the thesis in 
modern philosophy. 
5.2 The modern conception of philosophy 
 
In contemporary times ‘philosophy’ commonly refers to a subject of study- an academic 
discipline that often finds its home in the university philosophy department.60 As a subject 
of study, philosophy is generally understood as an intellectual activity that involves asking 
and attempting to answer fundamental questions about reality and human existence.61 
Philosophy aims at knowledge of the world and our place in it. As a discipline, philosophy is 
divided into different branches including metaphysics, logic, ethics, philosophy of science, 
philosophy of art etc. The different branches of philosophy are distinguished by the specific 
subject matter that they are concerned with. Each branch of philosophy attempts to answer 
certain questions related to the subject matter in the different branches. For example: 
philosophy of science investigates what science is, philosophy of art investigates what art is, 
ethics investigates what it means to live well etc.62 The subject matter of philosophy 
includes a wide range of topics including morality, freewill, causation, justice etc.  
As practiced today, academic philosophy is discursive and communal in nature. 
Philosophical practice is carried out by asking questions and thinking about those questions 
in dialogue with others.  Philosophers attend conferences, give lectures and publish their 
work, and through this enter into dialogue with other philosophers (and sometimes with the 
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general public). In this sense philosophy is a social activity. Philosophers do philosophy by 
engaging with other members of their community. The discursive method is in line with the 
Socratic practice of philosophy as I described it in chapter two.  
Philosophical inquiry consists in the study and development of theoretical discourses. These 
theoretical discourses are formulated in the form of arguments and theories. The goal of 
philosophy is the production of a coherent system of theoretical knowledge. Philosophers 
aim at the production of theories. For example there are theories of knowledge, theories of 
justice, theories of causation etc. that are produced in philosophy. In so far as it aims at 
theoretical knowledge, philosophy is no different from subjects such as the sciences. It only 
differs from these subjects in the subject matter that it concerns itself with and hence also 
the content of the propositional knowledge it produces. That academic philosophy aims at 
no more than a perfect system of propositional knowledge is clear from philosophy’s focus 
on developing theories. 
Of course philosophers sometimes hope that the knowledge they produce will help shape 
society in similar ways to how science shapes society through its findings. For example an 
answer to the question of whether or not we are free shapes how we think about moral 
responsibility and could influence perspectives on societal issues such as punishment and 
justice. The point is that most philosophers today are satisfied with philosophy even if it 
does not have any practical implications for them or for society. The propositional 
knowledge produced through philosophical inquiry is taken to be valuable in and of itself 
even if it does not help to transform us as human beings.  I think this fact that philosophers 
are often satisfied with studying and producing theories that have no practical relevance to 
society is part of what makes the question about the value of philosophy so contested.63 
The success of philosophy in producing knowledge is highly questionable. Philosophy has 
not had great success in producing satisfactory theories. There is no perfect theory of 
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anything in philosophy. This need not mean that philosophers know nothing at all. In fact I 
think philosophers know a great deal. However, their knowledge is imperfect and only 
partial. What I mean is that the philosopher who has been investigating what justice is may 
not be able to give a completely satisfactory account of what justice is but they have a 
better understanding of it than the person who has not engaged in such a philosophical 
investigation. Thus we can say that philosophers have a kind of partial knowledge or ‘better 
understanding’ even if they do not produce perfect theories.  
5.3 Comparing the modern and Platonic conceptions of philosophy 
 
Now that the general conception of modern philosophy is in place, let us compare it with 
the Platonic conception of philosophy. 
The fundamental difference between the two conceptions is in how they understand the 
objects and goals of philosophy. In the Platonic conception, philosophical activity is 
constituted by inquiry into the nature of the Good. Hence all the branches of philosophy are 
subordinate to ethics. All thinking in the different fields of philosophy aims at knowledge of 
the Good. This philosophical investigation is for the sake of becoming good. The knowledge 
that is achieved through philosophical investigation shapes the philosopher’s character and 
their way of life. The transformative power of philosophical inquiry into the Good is 
important in Plato’s conception of philosophy. 
In contrast, the modern conception takes philosophy as an activity of the intellect, with no 
necessary bearing on one’s conduct or character. The final end of philosophy, on the 
modern conception, is not necessarily self-transformation for virtue but rather theoretical 
knowledge. Modern philosophers generally do not view their philosophical activities as 
aimed at transforming their way of being or as necessarily capable of transforming their 
lives. Philosophical inquiry is for most modern philosophers “an exclusively theoretical 
discourse, with no direct relationship to one’s conduct in life.”64 The contemporary 
conception of philosophy places philosophical discourses as the final end of philosophical 
inquiry whereas the ancient conception views these discourses as means to the ultimate 
goal of transforming the individual for virtue. 
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Furthermore, in contrast to the Platonic conception where the ultimate object of 
philosophical inquiry is the Good, modern philosophy does not have a ‘final’ object of study 
that unites all the fields studied in philosophy. Different objects are studied independently 
in the different fields of philosophy. There is no main object of inquiry that must be 
investigated if true philosophical knowledge is to be achieved. The assumption is that all the 
objects of philosophy can be known independently of each other. The Platonic Good is 
studied only in ethics in modern philosophy.   
These differences in the two conceptions of philosophy have important implications for how 
we understand the necessity thesis. The necessity thesis is, broadly, a claim about the 
relationship between moral virtue and philosophy. In particular, the thesis claims that moral 
virtue is necessary for making progress in philosophy. In the Platonic conception, the 
necessity thesis amounts to the view that imperfect virtue is necessary for wisdom because 
philosophy ultimately aims at wisdom. But as is clear from our comparison above, the goals 
of modern philosophy are not necessarily wisdom, understood as knowledge of the Good, 
but theoretical knowledge. Thus in the modern conception, the necessity thesis would be 
understood as the view that partial moral virtue is necessary for achieving theoretical 
knowledge of the objects of philosophy. The point here is that on the modern conception of 
philosophy the necessity thesis says that imperfect virtue is necessary not for wisdom as 
such, but for theoretical knowledge of philosophical objects.  
Now that we understand what the necessity thesis amounts to in the modern conception, 
we can evaluate its plausibility. 
5.4 Moral virtue and modern philosophy 
 
Can we say that we need to be morally virtuous to make progress in philosophy? To answer 
this it is helpful to recall the two interpretations of the necessity thesis that I outlined in the 
beginning.  
On the first interpretation of the thesis, according to which moral virtue is necessary for 
carrying out philosophical inquiry, we can easily say that moral virtue is necessary for 
progress in modern philosophy. Philosophical inquiry, as practiced in contemporary times, is 
34 
 
a difficult subject. It involves inquiry into very difficult questions that demand long and 
careful study. It will be accepted then that intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, 
intelligence, love of truth and good memory are necessary for philosophical inquiry. 
According to the first interpretation of the necessity thesis, we also need moral virtues to 
successfully engage in the process of philosophical inquiry. As far as modern philosophy 
involves difficult inquiry and is a social activity, we need moral virtue to succeed in this 
inquiry. Moral virtue is required for the process of philosophical inquiry both the modern 
and Platonic conceptions. I have already shown how moral virtue is necessary to deal with 
the difficulty and cooperative nature of philosophical inquiry in chapter one so I will not 
repeat myself here. 
On the second interpretation, the answer to the question of whether or not we need moral 
virtue for philosophy is less straightforward. The second interpretation states that moral 
virtue is necessary for understanding the objects of philosophy. The question then becomes: 
is moral virtue necessary to understand the objects of modern philosophy? In other words, 
does one need to be morally virtuous to achieve knowledge in modern philosophy? I think 
the modern philosopher would be inclined to say no to this question. It is difficult to see 
how one’s moral character is relevant to one’s ability to come to certain true propositions 
about the things that they study in philosophy. It is especially difficult to see this connection 
in fields such as logic, philosophy of science etc. For example: how is one’s understanding of 
causation dependent on their moral character? It seems that one can understand causation 
and hold certain true propositions about it independently of how their moral character is. 
The achievement of propositional knowledge, at least in some fields of philosophy, seems 
independent of one’s moral character. So how can we make sense of the necessity thesis ? 
According to Plato, true knowledge is necessarily knowledge of the Good. The kind of 
knowledge we have of such things as causation is merely partial knowledge. In Republic, 
Plato takes this kind of partial knowledge as ‘opinion’ (Republic 477b). He says that this kind 
of knowledge is better than ignorance but worse than knowledge itself (Republic 478c). In 
other words, partial knowledge is not quite the same as knowledge but it is better than 
ignorance. Thus, perhaps Plato would concede that partial knowledge can be obtained by 
someone who lacks virtue. What he would deny, given his commitment to the necessity 
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thesis, is that perfect knowledge (knowledge of the Good) is possible without moral virtue. 
Knowledge of the Good, according to Plato, requires one to be moral virtuous.  
This response, as outlined here, is very brief and sketchy. A more satisfactory response 
requires a much deeper understanding and explanation of Plato’s metaphysics which is 
beyond the scope of this paper and not really relevant. The point that I would like to 
emphasise is that Plato would not consider the knowledge we have of such things as 
causation as knowledge proper since for him true knowledge is knowledge of the Good 
(Republic 476c-d).  So he would not deny that propositional knowledge, which is some kind 
of partial knowledge, is possible without moral virtue in such fields as philosophy of science, 
logic etc. But I think that because of his commitment to the similarity thesis, he would 
maintain that some moral virtue is necessary for achieving theoretical knowledge in ethics. 
Recall that Plato’s necessity thesis is based on the principle of ‘like-knows-like’. Knowledge 
of the Good requires one to be good to some extent because of the principle that ‘like-
knows-like’. In the next section, I want to show that ethics partly investigates the Good and 
as such to achieve knowledge of the Good in ethics one needs to be partially good. 
 
5.5 The necessity thesis and modern ethics 
 
In order to evaluate whether partial moral virtue is necessary for knowledge in modern 
ethics, we need a better understanding of the objects of ethics. In this section I will briefly 
explain what philosophical ethics is concerned with and then move on to consider whether 
moral virtue is necessary for ethics.  
We have seen that for Plato ethics is the primary field of philosophy. The primary object of 
study for Platonic philosophy is virtue (the Good). This is evident from Plato’s focus on 
understanding virtue in the dialogues. When we think about ethics today, we are apt to 
think about right and wrong actions, duties and moral rules of conduct. The question of 
virtue is not central in modern ethics.   
The principal concern in ethics today is the question of “how we should live?” Thus the 
subject matter of ethics is broad since the question “how should we live our lives?” is a 
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general one. It goes beyond the everyday question of “what shall I do” now, in such and 
such a situation. It is a question about the manner of life that one should adopt.65  Virtue is 
studied indirectly under this question of ‘how to live well’. There is a branch of ethics that is 
called ‘virtue ethics’ focuses primarily on the question of virtue. This branch investigates 
virtue within the broader question of ethics. 
Ethics takes as its subject something that concerns everyone directly: the subject of how 
one ought to live.66 In order to address the question “how should we live?” students of 
ethics investigate concepts such as justice, courage, right and wrong etc. Ethics is essentially 
an investigation of what is good for human beings and how to achieve it. But what does the 
investigation into these ethical concepts/objects aim at? 
For ancient philosophers, ethics aimed at virtue and thus was ultimately practical. In 
contrast, modern ethics investigates questions of how to live well and produces 
propositional knowledge. This in itself is not a bad thing. As a kind of inquiry, ethics must 
have a cognitive goal. In studying ethics we are investigating the truth about ethical matters. 
We want to know what justice, courage and so on is, and one way to do this is to seek out 
true propositions about these objects. The problem arises when ethics stops at the level of 
propositional knowledge and does not then transform the practice or conduct of its 
subjects.  
What philosophers study makes no more claim to affecting their personal lives than 
the work of physicists, mathematicians, or economists is expected to affect theirs. 
And yet there is a lingering sense in most people as well as in a few philosophers, 
that somehow that is not how matters should be, a sense of puzzlement and even of 
disappointment that the lives of philosophers do not reflect their convictions.67  
The concern expressed in this quote about the separation of one’s philosophical thoughts 
and one’s conduct is especially pertinent in ethics. I think generally we would be less 
concerned if one’s philosophies- understood as philosophical theories- in fields such as 
metaphysics and logic did not inform their practice. These fields seem, strictly speaking, 
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indirectly relevant to one’s conduct. For example it is difficult to see how the logician or 
metaphysician’s inquiries could transform them as far as their conduct is concerned. The 
subject matter of these inquiries often has no direct bearing on the moral conduct of the 
subjects. Perhaps the principles of logic are used indirectly to justify certain types of moral 
conduct. But such principles, it seems, have no direct influence of the logician’s moral 
conduct. 
In the case of ethics, however, the principal subject matter- the question of how to live well- 
is of direct relevance to one’s conduct. We conduct ourselves in particular ways partly as a 
function of the way in which we think about what the best form of life is and what we ought 
to do. Thus it is in this sphere that we should clearly see philosophy’s transformative 
potential. Through ethical inquiry, philosophers can come to particular views of how to live 
well and these views can and should shape the way of life that they adopt. So ethical inquiry 
can and should have the transformative effect on those who study it.68 
When we study ethics, we presumably want to get knowledge of how we should live and to 
use that knowledge to inform how we act in our daily lives.69 In other words, we intend, or 
should intend, for ethical inquiry to inform our life practices. Ethical inquiry is the one kind 
of inquiry that has the most potential for transforming the inquirer’s conduct. This is 
because of the subject matter of ethics. As we said before, ethics is concerned with the 
question of how to live well. This immediately suggests that ethics can guide us in our 
conduct- it can tell us how to live well. And by telling us how to live well, ethics can 
transform our lives. The philosopher must use his ethical theories to guide his practice. As 
Aristotle says: ethics is not “for the sake of contemplation, as the other kinds of study are 
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(for we are investigating not in order that we might know what virtue is, but in order that 
we might become good, since otherwise there would be no benefit from it) (NE 1103b).” 
“The end in matters of action (ethics) is not contemplating and knowing each of them but 
rather doing them. It is not sufficient to know about virtue, but one must try to have it and 
use it, unless there is some other way that we become good (NE 1179b).” The point is that 
the knowledge we find through ethical inquiry must inform our practice so that we may 
become good. Having propositional knowledge about what is good is not sufficient for 
becoming good. One must use that knowledge to guide their conduct. We must engage in 
ethics in order to be able to “judge beautifully about things that are conducive to living 
well.”70  
The point I am making here is that modern ethics, as is currently practiced, aims at 
theoretical knowledge. This is not necessarily a bad thing. But it seems that ethics should be, 
and is capable of, transforming our practices and helping us live better lives. This is 
something that I think ethics should be more focused on: making us better people. But for 
our investigation now, we are interested in whether theoretical knowledge in ethics 
requires one to have a good character. We have explained what the objects of ethics are 
and now we can attempt to answer this question. 
5.6 Is moral virtue necessary to achieve moral knowledge? 
 
I want to show that partial moral virtue is necessary to achieve ethical knowledge. In other 
words, I want to say that a good moral character is necessary for an accurate theoretical 
understanding of the objects of ethics.  
The opponent of the necessity thesis would reject the view that moral virtue is necessary for 
ethical knowledge. He will deny that one needs to be of a good moral character to achieve 
moral knowledge. In order to reject the thesis successfully, the opponent must believe that 
a completely evil person can have moral knowledge. It is implausible to maintain that a 
completely evil person can have moral knowledge. The evil person is constituted by beliefs, 
inclinations and desires that are bad. These things are what make him evil. He has a 
particular moral orientation and outlook that is evil. He has false beliefs about what is 
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morally good. These beliefs and attitudes prevent him from coming to a true understanding 
of what the good is. Let me illustrate my point with an example.  
Suppose that a Nazi or racist constructs a theory of justice. We may reasonably expect that 
his theory of justice will be tainted by his moral character. His strong hatred for Jews or 
black people would make it difficult for him to understand that justice involves equality and 
fairness, or at least, he would have a hard time understanding that equality ought to be 
extended to all people. His theory of justice would thus fail to capture some of the central 
features of justice (such as equality among all people) due to his bad moral character. 
Examples such as these show that one’s understanding of philosophical objects in ethics is 
partly shaped by their moral character, and thus make it plausible to assume that partial 
moral virtue is necessary for ethics. 
The Nazi/racist example shows that a morally deficient character will fail to have an 
accurate understanding of the nature of virtue or morality. This is the basic point of the 
similarity thesis. An unjust moral character is constituted by desires and beliefs that present 
justice as being contrary to what it truly is. The unjust person is unjust because he believes 
justice to be something that it is not. His views about what justice is do not correlate with 
what justice really is. So he cannot give a correct account of what justice is. Our beliefs, 
which form part of our moral character, must reflect justice as it is in order for us to have an 
accurate understanding of justice. 
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Conclusion 
In this paper I tried to understand Plato’s necessity thesis and to evaluate it. The general 
claim of the necessity thesis is that moral virtue is necessary to make progress towards 
achieving the goals of philosophy. I offered two interpretations of the necessity thesis. One 
interpretation suggests that the necessity thesis states that moral virtue is necessary 
because of the difficulty and cooperative nature of philosophical inquiry. On this account, 
moral virtue is needed to successfully carry out philosophical inquiry as an activity. The 
second interpretation suggests that moral virtue is necessary to achieve knowledge of the 
specific objects of philosophy. I explained that the latter interpretation captures a more 
intimate connection between moral virtue and philosophy, and restricted myself to 
understanding this interpretation more precisely in the subsequent chapters. 
I considered what Plato’s conception of philosophy is and showed that for him philosophy 
ultimately aims at knowledge of the Good- wisdom. In light of this conception, I revised the 
necessity thesis and formulated it as the claim that moral virtue is necessary for knowledge 
of the Good. I then suggested that the main problem with this formulation of the necessity 
thesis is that it is self-defeating. It seems to be saying that one needs to be virtuous to 
achieve virtue. This makes no sense. I looked at Plato’s theory of virtue in Republic and 
suggested that the necessity thesis should be properly understood as the view that 
imperfect virtue is necessary for coming to know the Good. This means that one must be 
disposed to the good and have true beliefs about what it is in order to come to an accurate 
understanding of it.  
I then moved on to explain Plato’s reasons for holding the necessity thesis. Here I suggested 
that the necessity thesis is supported by the similarity thesis and tried to show how the 
similarity between an imperfectly virtuous character and the Good helps one come to an 
accurate understanding of what the Good is. 
In the last chapter I considered the relevance of the necessity thesis in modern philosophy. I 
showed that the necessity thesis is relevant and plausible in modern ethics. We cannot have 
ethical knowledge without being good to some extent. 
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A large part of this paper was dedicated to understanding the necessity thesis. If we are 
convinced that moral virtue is necessary for philosophy, then questions of whether certain 
moral requirements for studying philosophy arise. But even if we are not really convinced by 
Plato’s particular reasons and conception of what kind of moral character is necessary for 
philosophy, I hope it is at least clear that there is an interesting and important relationship 
between moral character and philosophy that deserves further study.  
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